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Summary. In this paper I revisit the Mussa and Rosen (1978) model.
However, unlike Mussa and Rosen, I assume that there is a positive mass
of the consumers of the highest possible type. I call them snobs. I prove
that snobs consumers are served eﬃciently and the product line decreases
in the mass of the serious consumers. Moreover, if the mass of the serious
consumers is more than some critical level then they are the only consumers
who are served at equilibrium.
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11 Introduction
The topic of imperfect information ﬁrst attracted researches in the mid-
dle of the seventies. Probably the ﬁrst paper in the area is Mirrlees (1971).
Some of the early papers (e. g. Adams and Yellen, 1976) used a ﬁnite num-
ber of types. For an excellent review of such models and the main result in
that area, the so called constraint reduction theorem, one can consult the
still unpublished but available on the web notes of Stole (2000). From Mussa
and Rosen (1978) on the interest ﬁrmly shifted to the models with a con-
tinuum of types. Similar models, arising from diﬀerent economic situations,
were considered by Mirman and Sibley (1980), Baron and Myerson (1982),
Sappington (1983), and Maskin and Riley (1984) among others. For a text-
book treatment of the model with a continuum of types see, for example,
Fudenberg and Tirole (1992).
Models with a discrete set and a continuum of types share some common
f e a t u r e s .I nb o t ht y p e so fm o d e l st h et o pt y p ei ss e r v e de ﬃciently and the
lowest type gets the reservation utility.1 One important diﬀerence, however,
is that in discrete models it is possible that only one type, the highest one, is
1Provided that the participation constraint is not type dependent. See Jullien (2000)
for a discussion.
2served at equilibrium, while in the models with a continuum of types the set
of types served at equilibrium always includes more than one type (in fact,
continuum of types).
In this paper I consider a model in which the distribution of types is
absolutely continuous on (0,1) but possesses an atom at one. I call that
consumers of the highest possible type snobs. The upper bound of the type
space reﬂects the price at which another luxury good of a ﬁxed quality can
be pirchased. For example, assume that a monopolist is a car producer
that produces cars of diﬀerent qualities. The General Motors, for instance,
produces Cadillac, Buick, Oakland, Chevrolet, which diﬀer in quality and
target diﬀerent segments of the market. Caddilac is designed for the snobs
and a big part of utility they derive from driving the car comes fron showing
oﬀ. However, if the price of a Cadillac goes too high, the snobs might choose
another way to show oﬀ. For example, she may buy a yacht. Then the
maximal price anyone will be willing to pay for a Caddilac will be limited
by the price of a yacht. Therefore, though a priori the valuations of snobs
of the car per se might diﬀer, after including the value of showing oﬀ and
optimizing over the ways to do so, the will tend to cluster at some value,
which I normalize to be one. As a result, one will observe a probability mass
3at one.
Another way to justify the mass at one is to assume that there are two
types of the consumers: privater and industrial. The marginal utility for the
industrial consumers is simply equal to the marginal product, which in turn
is determined by the most eﬃcient current technology. I will normalize the
marginal utility of the industrial consumers to be one. I will also assume
that there is a continuum of private consumers whose tastes for quality are
distributed on (0,1) according to a continuous density function. Existence
of the industrial quality goods is a widely observed phenomenon. Google
search produces 131,000 matches for the industrial quality and advertises a
variety of goods such as xeroxes, water ﬁlters, saw blades, and many others.
These goods are usually available at industrial quality or ordinary quality
levels. The model developed in this paper explains the prevalence of indus-
trial quality goods without assuming that there is a gap in tastes between
private and institutional consumers. This feature is rather attractive, since
some private consumers may have rather high demands for quality.
The ﬁrst result is that, probably not surprisingly, the top types are still
served eﬃciently and the lowest type earns no information rents. More inter-
esting result is that the size of the optimal product line decreases in the mass
4of serious consumers. Moreover, if the mass of serious consumers is above
some critical level, the serious consumers are the only ones served at equilib-
rium. For a wide class of distributions this threshold level depends only on
the limit of the density of not serious consumers at the right end of the dis-
tribution and is unrelated to the ﬁner details of the distribution. Moreover,
the optimal quality is discontinuous at the right hand of the distribution,
i. e. there is a quality gap. It is worth mentioning that the results will
remain qualitatively the same if the quality probability mass is concentrated
i nt h ei n t e r i o rp o i n to ft h et y p es p a c e ,r a t h e rt h a na ti t sr i g h th a n d . S u c h
a formulation will allow for some private consumers have a higher valuation
for the quality than do the industrial consumers. I will continue to assume
t h a tt h ep o s i t i v em a s si so nt h er i g h te n df o rs i m p l i c i t y .
The paper is organized in a following well. In Section 2 I introduce the
model and discuss its general properties. In Section 3 I solve an example.
Section 4 concludes.
52T h e m o d e l
Consider a continuum of consumers each of whom is interested in buying
at most one unit of an indivisible good. Diﬀerent units of the goods may,
however, diﬀer in quality, x. The marginal rate of substitution between
quality and money, α, does not depend on quality but diﬀers across the
consumers, i. e. the utility has a form
u(α,x,t)=αx − t, (1)
where t is the amount paid to the monopolist. I assume that α is private
information of the consumer. However, it is common knowledge that α is
distributed on [0,1] according to a measure
µ =( 1− γ)λ + γδ1, (2)
where γ ∈ (0,1) i st h em a s so ft h es e r i o u sc o n s u m e r s , measure λ is absolutely
continuous with respect to the Lebesgue measure with the Radon-Nykodim
derivative f(·), while δ1 is the Dirac’s measure concentrated at one. We as-
sume that f is twice diﬀerentiable and strictly positive and weakly increasing
6on [0,1) and
lim
α→1f(α) ≡ f(1) < ∞. (3)
Let F(·) be the cumulative distribution function, corresponding to density





and assume that it is strictly increasing in α. This assumptions allows us
to concentrate on the so-called relaxed problem, i. e. the problem in which
we drop the constraint that the allocation x(·) is increasing (see, Mussa and
Rosen, 1978).
The utility of the outside option is same across the consumers and is
normalized to be zero. The cost of production is convex in quality and linear
across consumers and is given by a twice diﬀerentiable, strictly increasing,
convex function c(x). I assume that
c(0) = c
0(0) = 0. (5)
The above consideration can be summarized by the following model. The





(t(x(α)) − c(x(α)))dµ(α), (6)
subject to
x(α) ∈ argmax(u(α,x) − t(x)) (7)
max(u(α,x) − t(x)) ≥ 0. (8)
The ﬁrst of this constraints is known as the incentive compatibility constraint
and guarantees that each consumer selects optimally, while the second is
the individual rationality or participation constraint that states that each
consumer should get utility, which is at least as large as that of the outside
option.
Introducing the consumer surplus by
s(α)=m a x
x≥0
(αx − t(x)) (9)




(αx − c(x) − s)dµ(α). (10)




(αx − c(x) − s)f(α)dα + γ(x(1) − c(x(1)) − s(1)). (11)
Note that equation (9) and the envelope theorem2 imply:
s
0(α)=x(α) (12)
for all α ∈ (0,1).I ti sa l s op o s s i b l et os h o wt h a ts(·) is absolutely continuous.
Therefore,




Transforming the ﬁrst integral in (11) using integration by parts (see, Mussa
and Rosen, 1978) and taking into account (13) the monopolist’s objective






[(v(α) − c(x))f(α) −
γ
1 − γ
]dα + γ(x(1) − c(x(1)) − s(0). (14)
The optimality conditions now imply,
s(0) = 0. (15)
i. e. the lowest type gets her reservation utility,
c
0(x(1)) = 1, (16)
the “no distortion at the top” property and
c
0(x)=m a x ( vγ(α),0) (17)





Note, that under our assumption on the distribution of types vγ(α) increases
in α for all γ. Therefore, since the cost in convex in x, the allocation deﬁned
10by (17) is increasing and therefore, implementable. Also note that
vγ(α) <v (α) (19)
for all α. This implies three things. First, if type α is served under both
conditions γ =0and γ>0 the downward distortion is stronger under the
second regime. Second, the exclusion region increases in γ in the set theoretic
sense. Third, the product line deﬁned by:
[0,v γ(1)) ∪ {x(1)} (20)
is decreasing in γ and is not connected for γ>0.N o t et h a ti f
vγ(1) ≤ 0 (21)





Note that γ depends only on the value of f(1) (it is increasing in f(1))
and not on the ﬁner details of the distribution. Note also that since f(·) is
11assumed to be non-decreasing and integrate to one, f(1) ≥ 1, therefore in
order to exclude all non-serious consumers γ should be at least 1/2.
3A n u m e r i c a l e x a m p l e
Let us consider a speciﬁcc a s eo ft h em o d eo ft h ep r e v i o u ss e c t i o n .A s s u m e
that
f(α)=1 , (23)











The exclusion region is [0,3/4] which is a superset of the [0,1/3], the exclusion




) ∪ {1}, (26)
12where qualities between in the range [0,1/2) are purchased by the consumers
whose types belong to [3/4,1), while the serious consumers purchase the good











Note that the serious consumers are served eﬃciently and are indiﬀerent
between selecting their contract or purchasing good of quality 1/2 at t(1/2) =
7/16. However, since the good of quality exactly 1/2 is not oﬀered by the
monopolist, they strictly prefer their contract to any other deal oﬀered by
the market.
4C o n c l u s i o n s
In this paper I take the ﬁrst step to bridge the gap between screening
models with discrete and continuous types. For this purpose, I revisit the
13Mussa and Rosen (1978) model. However, unlike Mussa and Rosen, I assume
that there is a positive mass of the consumers of the highest possible type. I
call them serious consumers.
The main results of the paper are the following. The serious consumers
are served eﬃciently and the product line decreases in the mass of the serious
consumers. Moreover, if the mass of the serious consumers is more than some
critical level then they are the only consumers who are served at equilibrium.
For a wide class of distributions this threshold level depends only on the limit
of the density of not serious consumers at the right end of the distribution and
is unrelated to the ﬁner details of the distribution. Moreover, the optimal
quality is discontinuous at the right hand of the distribution, i. e. the
optimal product line is not connected. The eﬃcient quality always belongs
to the optimal product line.
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